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Christian theology, focused on a real life 
of man and speaking about the immanence of 
God, is not surprising us today. In this behalf 
the advantages of immanent God over the 
transcendent appear to be tempting, since they 
open a ways for topical sermon, which advocates 
for improvement of the world in alignment with 
its inner divine deepness. 
There are no difficulties to see that this 
theology feeds up not only by the common 
transformation of religiosity, in which all the 
evidence of fatigue of transcendent can be 
simply discovered, but also by the thought 
which propels pan(en)teism to the new level of 
conceptualization. Among the modern concepts 
that feed up immanent theology, the major ones 
seems to be the “faith without faith” that inherits 
the deconstruction, and “plane of immanence”. 
In this article we will turn to the philosophy of 
G. Deleuze with intent to, by the example of this 
philosophy, trace the disruption of transcendent 
and resolve the issue of the possibility of 
immanence to become a theological condition.
1. The motif
“Plane of immanence” appears as a explicate 
substantiation of the motif of immanence. 
Agreeing with this motif, live can be only 
justified by the multiplicity, whereas endurance 
that underlines it can not be enchained by discrete 
cohesions of totalizations and subjectifications. 
Founding of authorities, which unify life and 
keep under the multiplication of differences, as it 
peculiar, according to Deleuze, to the Plato’s ideas, 
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renders it into the iteration of “The Same”, which 
it, per ce, can not be. Transcendental represents 
proximate implementation of this strategy, which 
is as peculiar to human’s nature, as it appears as 
something that has to be surmounted. Following 
Deleuze and Guattari: 
“There is not the slightest reason 
for thinking that modes of existence need 
transcendent values by which they could be 
compared, selected, and judged relative to 
one another. On the contrary, there are only 
immanent criteria. A possibility of life is 
evaluated through itself in the movements 
it lays out and the intensities it creates on a 
plane of immanence: what is not laid out or 
created is rejected”1.
Here they also stress, that the “men of a 
transcendence or a faith”, even ones like Paskal 
and Kierkegaard, practically pursue a purpose of 
intensification of life, so far as they preoccupied 
“with the infinite immanent possibilities brought 
by the one who believes that God exists”.
Subject appears to be an essence of life flowing 
inside it, and as it becomes more automatic and 
void of wholeness, as freely its flow performed. 
The problem of human subjectivity lies in the fact 
that it gets caught into the net of representation 
with the pole as identity of “I”. This identity 
determines all the illusions of transcendence, 
including God, which is invoked to give the 
subject eternal meaningfulness. Transcendental, 
even when its freed from “I”, serves the 
same purpose as transcendent, as long as it is 
determined by the dimension of consciousness2. 
Plus, explicated by Kant, it appears to be the 
same abstraction towards conditions of the real 
experience, as empiricism, that has been rejected 
by him, whereas in both cases thought is not able 
to explain (more precisely, implement) the process 
of individualization3. 
Persuasion of this argument is based on an 
idea that conditions of real experience of life could 
not be subordinated to the conditions of potential 
experience that compose the first step towards the 
transcendent. Here we deal with apparency, i.e. 
with the kind of experience that proves itself. But 
in any of this apparency the moment, in which 
this proof can not be accomplished, shows up 
sooner or later.
Undoubtedly, in the name of Deleuze 
we deal, by no means, not with “speculative 
thinker” that organizes the system of 
mediations. But the paradox of temporalizing 
towards eternity, of which Kierkegaard spoke, 
appears to be wider than the conditions of the 
real experience, on which Deleuze’s system 
based on. If higher activity is unconscious, 
and self-consciousness appears to be its mode 
in which it runs out and can resurrect only 
through self-destruction of this negative power, 
then such game of virtuality with itself appears 
to be too primitive compare with transcendent 
aspirations of existential. Absurd eternity 
of soul, that beginning in time, goes beyond 
representation and isn’t a result of pushing it 
to the «orgiastic» limits, not least because it 
excludes meaningless iteration of fold/unfold 
Being and appeal to experience, which spreads 
far beyond limits of not only transcendental 
conditions (“indifference of possibility”, as 
Kierkegaard spoke), but the conditions of reality 
as well. That output has its circumstantiation 
based on idea that consciousness can not 
be determined by anything more «stupid», 
than itself, whereas this «something» makes 
semblance of possessing resources (matter or 
virtual powers) aimed to make an actual being. 
With allowance for immateriality of virtual we 
can repeat well-known arguments against the 
concept of matter that produces consciousness. 
Thus, ascention towards superconciousness 
stands against reduction to unconsciousness.
The motif of immanence stops in a point 
that Kierkegaard explains as «religiousness A». 
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Nevertheless, existence doomed to become an 
eternal solution in time, i.e. to determine itself in 
eternity, even if this eternity is a «eternal return». 
Discrepancy between «now» of existence 
and eternity, in only which this «now» gains 
significance, can not have a meaning of just an 
illusion, by virtue of the fact that it is constitutive 
for existence that exceeds own extremity.
Here, following Bergson, it seems possible 
to say that this «existential surplus» only shows 
that there is the delay at the base of the mode of 
human existence in response to external impact, 
which, by its nature, tends to complicate. I.e. 
there would be a question of reason as an ability 
that determines human being, and of weakness 
of arguments (from value, from the absurd and 
from conflict – Deleuze mentions them at the 
very beginning of its work on Kant4) in favor 
of the gap between nature and culture. But the 
matter is not in the production of the transcendent 
itself, which occurs as if it’s being forced to, due 
to the fact that the mind requires a completed 
synthesis, but in its content. Immortality and 
eternal bliss are the subjects of faith. Although 
Deleuze did not consider faith as an independent 
ability, it is clear that the transcendental use 
of reason would be devoid of any existential 
meaning if it did not meet the requirements 
of faith in the conjugation of its absurd things 
with a real life experience. Therefore, the work 
of the reason is determined not only by need 
of completed synthesis, but mainly by the 
question of the meaning of existence. And this 
meaning does not stop only on a human’s life 
(here Bergson’s objections could be extended), 
but about being in general. Even statement that 
the question of the meaning of life is not valid, 
because being is its own meaning, means, that 
at the moment this illegal questioning being 
does not belong to himself unreservedly. This 
is most noticeable when it comes to novelty 
as the essence of life. Discourse on «vanity of 
vanities» problematizes this novelty in the same 
existential sense in which it is intended to serve 
as a basis for understanding and transformation 
of the person as it turns out that in human being 
who rose above the vanity, life continues and 
absents at the same time.
However, the motif of the transcendent 
is not able to establish itself completely. How 
to call “the eternal bliss” something that is not 
determined by earthly experiences, without which 
this concept in general might not occur, remains 
under wraps for this motif. In other words, this 
motif transcends life only negatively, requiring 
such of it transformation, which excludes vitality, 
despite the fact that it comes out of it. Thus, 
transcendental bliss appears an immanent figure 
and receives meaning only out of it. Although the 
motive of immanence also can’t dispense without 
the requirement for the transformation of human 
existence, he pushes it to life to become the most 
adequately to its essence. At the same time, its 
strong words that the human self is vindictive 
by nature, saddled with a bad conscience, etc. 
destroy themselves, because they assume some 
absolute subjectivity, in which all these negative 
assessments are possible. Isn’t then Being become 
God that conquered subjectivity, i.e. in result no 
less absurd than transcended life?
Thus, the rivalry of immanent and 
transcendent motifs on the existential level does 
not give benefits to any of them. Therefore, 
each of them is committed to the secondary 
substantiation by which he could establish itself 
as a principle of life.
In this area, where the reason is called 
for serving the faith, the authority of Kant is, 
in our opinion, immutable, as the end result of 
any criticism of his teachings became, at best, 
one or other modification of what he called the 
regulative principle of reason. In this respect, the 
theory of immanence from Hegel to Deleuze5 is 
no exception.
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2. Three senses of the transcendent
In the “plane of immanence” transcendent is 
a figure of this plan, which is always conceptual, 
i.e. anyway laying out, inventing, and creating 
according to the philosophical faculty of 
coadaptation of these three elements. Immanence 
appears here radically different than in the 
dialectic, but the principle of returning to the 
world of what was taken from it by transcending 
remains unchanged. Following Zizek we can say 
that, according to this principle, transcendent 
destiny is radically contingent corporeal 
leftover6, in which it is forced to incarnate: the 
figure of resemblance, «fractured I», dead God. 
Transcendent appears transformed form of 
immanent, requires overcoming for the truth’s 
sake. Despite the fact that the task of overcoming 
has been set for a long time in a variety of 
versions, it still can’t succeed due to ambiguity 
of what actually has to happen. Deleuze, on an 
encyclopedic scale, tried to show the sprouts of 
this new reality in many different areas of life, but 
it did not result in the destruction of other views 
on the same things. In addition, competition 
theories that return transcendental to immanence 
excludes an option that would be acceptable to 
everyone, which could become a real scientific 
paradigm or social principles. Therefore, there is 
no guarantee that the «transcendental empiricism» 
that replaced dialectic will not suddenly become 
helpless in front of a new vision of reality. But lets 
assume that this overcoming has happened. Then 
it must become a memory, in the name of which 
the highest academic judgment of the theories 
and opinions would be carried out. Apostates 
will be blamed for an intent to unify life in spite 
of its diversity and adopt any one of its tendency 
as dominant over at the expense to others. Apart 
from the fact that in this way the principle of 
selection of suitors, for which Deleuze did not 
like Platonism, will be revived, that will also 
come to the fact that memory itself has ceased 
to be the pure past, which, according to Deleuze, 
has never been real. This memory will differ 
little from what Hegel called the end of history: 
the spirit that reached an absolute identity, should 
be forever guarding over its own degradation to 
what he has already overcome.
We do not bring the idea of immanence to 
the level of absurd by such thinking, but show 
that it has its transcendental degree and exists 
only in its perspective. Whenever transcendence 
returns to earth, it’s recreated once again, because 
it turns up to be the idea that every time slipping 
out of the entity into which has been caged by 
mind in order to return to the immanence. 
Speaking in Derrida’s terms, it appears to be an 
impossible idea, or rather the idea of impossibility 
as such. Even by accusing a category of possible 
in predetermining Being in alignment with 
unification, totalization and subjectivation, then, 
on this basis, will not be impossible to suspect 
that it is a superlatively possible, claiming 
semantic commonality between the actualization 
of Being and, as a consequence, the supremacy of 
Identity, since no Equality can rely on supremacy 
that sanctioned by transcendent, which is not 
defined by analogies and resemblances. “One 
and the same cast of Being”, of which Deleuze 
often says, is another name for the transcendent, 
which in itself is not differenciated, and even 
not differentiated. That is why differentiated 
Virtuality is essentially a regulatory principle 
that cages transcendent into the rigid framework 
of Differences. Being, Memory, Impersonality 
replaced God, immortal soul and good sovereign. 
As we can see, it is not necessary to declare the 
transcendence as supreme being and settle it 
in heaven in order to save its transcendence. It 
only expresses the fact that no sort of experience 
reaches its own grounds, which would be given 
in it as well as its objectivity that composes it, 
and therefore tends to its completion by the 
configuration that it can offer to itself as what it 
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defines (makes it real), according to one or the 
other “philosophical taste.”
Whatever this taste happens to be, it states 
as a last truth of Being either becoming, repeal 
any purpose, or some of its perfect condition to 
which or in which it is becoming carried out. And 
if the sense of the transcendent is determined 
only by this statement, then we would be dealing 
only with which of the antinomy of pure reason 
it is possible to build one or another “plan of 
immanence” and how best to configure the “thing-
in-itself” to connect, with the least contradictory, 
the real experience with what it is not given in it, 
but claimed by it.
Although this sense is well founded, it remains 
a very abstract with respect to motivation, which 
was the subject of discussed above. Whatever to 
be the content of such transcendence, it is unable 
to resolve the existential paradox of temporalizing 
to eternity. At this point, the Reason is useless for 
other abilities that were hoping for him as a force 
capable of bringing them beyond their limits. 
Among all the abilities, faith is different in the 
fact that such withdrawal means its death. As 
soon as one of the ability achieves a configuration 
in which it imagines that it has performed itself 
absolutely, an activity of faith ends. In contrast, 
when each ability finds out that it can not serve 
as either themselves or to others for their ultimate 
goals, only faith harmonize their action, using the 
combined services of all of them. The retribution 
for such harmony is absurd, which also appears 
to be the rational absurd (e.g., creatio ex nihilo), 
moral (Abraham) and aesthetic (Cross). Deleuze 
keeps away from the faith and takes absurd 
beyond the abilities, where it becomes a “para-
sens” of virtual Ideas that stimulate the disjointed 
and paradoxical using of abilities7. But such a 
move obviously transcends experience in the 
direction of the Difference that acquires features 
of hypostatized reality, and thus remains as a 
move of a «speculative thinker».
For Deleuze games with the transcendent 
mean intensification of life which is inspired 
whenever its call for the re-developing of the 
aligned space where it can fulfill it’s potential in a 
new way and, on this basis, to require the virtual 
additional funding. But every intensification of 
such kind can be understood also as building a 
hierarchy in which the concepts of immanence 
become the figures of transcendent. If we return 
to the motivation, we can see that life is motivated 
by the death of no less than the living, and that 
every renovation brings the same unattainable, to 
which human life is closer than any of those that 
are known to us, and therefore able to be cultural. 
Maybe someone excites becoming-wolf, but this 
excitement would not subsist if it was not a man. 
Therefore, it can’t be excluded that the formation 
as a becoming-god is the sense of human life, 
which defines and because of what there are all 
the other senses. To put this becoming to a reverse 
movement in the plan of immanence means to 
lose the opportunity to ever perform it. Thus, the 
second sense of the transcendent determined by 
the ability of faith and lies in absurd overcoming 
of earthly life. It is impossible cancel or reduce it 
to the first meaning, because it is religious by its 
own nature and provides a radical transformation 
of immanence.
Here it should be noted that the concept, 
by which faith determines the Reason on its 
antithetical way, is nonbeing. And Deleuze, 
following this path, objectively can not deal without 
this notion, contrary to the critic he subjected it to 
putting a false problem. Being, which smoothes 
its folds, gives, seemingly, good reason to assert 
complete disappearance of subjectivity, the unity 
of which is, moreover, illusory. But the problem 
of total disappearance can not be solved in this 
way, even if we endow transcendent virtuality 
with attribute of undifferenciated, which is quite 
clear for the language of actuality8 (like the ocean, 
which rolling on its surface, not separated from it, 
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and at the same time contains it all as it may be, 
in itself). The fullness of the virtuality excludes 
such disappearance, but assumes an infinite non-
actuality of the person, which made its way of life, 
and the same non-identical repetition of it in other 
worlds. This endless «reincarnation» occurring at 
the behest of the supreme cause, establishes a kind 
of eternity – eternal duration, which passes into 
moments of actualization. But as only difference 
repeated (actualized) rather than identity, «zeroing 
mechanism» must take its place in a virtuality, 
which although presents itself not a universal fire, 
as of the Stoics, but still excludes an accumulation 
of the actual memory9. Otherwise, Being should 
be replenished despite its entirety, even if to 
think it as infinite. (If fullness is an infinite flow 
within itself, then infinity turns into limit, which 
this fullness can not cross to be determined only 
by itself. Moreover, the novelty, the difference, 
deviation, etc. have its meaning only in relation to 
something antecedent, concluded in resemblance, 
analogy, etc.). Ontological meaning of forgetting 
is impossible without non-being, which doesn’t 
belong to Being, i.e., is not a «being of the 
problematic» or negation, managing the actuality 
of existence. But in the order of univocity there 
is no such a non-being. This means that in the 
very existence there must be a mechanism that 
is contrary to its nature, but at the same time 
belongs to it as its own. It is not difficult to see 
the same paradox here, by which the existential 
is determined, with the difference that the 
temporalizing towards eternity turns into eternal 
temporalizing, in which a single cast of Being and 
eternal forgetting «always return». This is quite 
subjective structure by its nature that, even freed 
from the «personal measuring», becomes absurd 
object that faith claims beyond its philosophical 
denial in a «plan of immanence».
Not every person can be gladden by the 
perspective of memory lapses that frees him 
away from the endless, even though diverse, 
state of being in the «vanity of vanities.» Some 
would prefer that metaphysical oblivion deals 
with him forever in spite of the joy that Deleuze 
promised from behind Spinoza. But, in any case, 
transcending life towards eternity, intensification 
or absolute extinction is determined not by the 
dictates of experience, but by a thirst for death, 
which is driven by faith that mobilizes ability to 
conquer the absurd that it claims by itself.
Generally, the reason (and not only the 
reason) is not willing to put up with this reality. 
Often enough power of thought inspires it so 
much that the reason, as it seems to itself, is able 
to overcome the absurd and destroy the faith, and 
it is exemplified by the philosophy of Deleuze. 
Those passages of thought by which he reduces to 
a minimum the possible gap between the virtuality 
and the actuality10, form configuration that claims 
the Difference as the principle of Being, enclosed 
in itself, and not in any transcendent source.
Here we come to apophasis, in which the 
third sense of the transcendent is defined. This 
meaning is established through denial, leading to 
mutual «first-origination»11 of being and thinking, 
i.e., through the absolute negation of the Other 
or the One and positing such a Being that does 
not possess its own beginning, and non-being 
that does not belong to being in any sense. This 
transcendence can be denied for the benefit of the 
immanence of Identity or Difference toward Being 
that contains the non-being as its own negativity, 
which is conceptualized dialectically or acquires 
a sense of what Deleuze called the (non)-being, or 
?-being12 (other conceptualizations are possible 
as well). But this denial is as hypothetical as 
statement that opposed to it, and also derived 
from it.
Modern critique of metaphysics comes 
from the fact that the transcendence in this 
third sense represents hyper-person called God 
that creates world. This statement is true with 
regard to theology, using the apophatic method 
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for the ascent to the «God without being» and 
equivocity interpretation of the uncreated and 
created being. But it is not effective against 
apophatic transcendence13. As it well-known, the 
second part of Plato’s “Parmenides” was not of 
the benefit, neither of an immortal soul, nor of 
the creation. Although the One of this dialogue 
presumes its teologization which reached the top 
in neo-Platonism, it is inherently unteological 
and strictly hypothetical, what is particularly 
well seen from the end of the dialogue. We 
note in passing that Deleuze certainly right in 
saying that the Other has the same rights as the 
One14, and this is true not only for the Other as 
a «model» for the simulacrum, i.e. not only in 
the sense of «transcendence in immanent «, but 
first and foremost as an apophatic principle that 
determines the being, but is not defined by it.
To the hypothetical procedure that, according 
to Deleuze, distorts the true movement of thought, 
he opposes the motion from the problematical to 
the question15. The motif of the proliferation of 
differences is a leading thing in this opposition, for 
which the hypothesis is something that contains 
the principle of choosing the best, i.e., determines 
the selection of claimants for the truth according 
to the moral imperative, and thus prevents the 
approval of fortuity, through which the eternal 
return of differences occurs. But it is obvious 
that in such a manner the Difference is excluded 
from hypotheses and becomes imperative that 
appeals to the conditions of a well-defining «real 
experience», including moral one, because it 
condemns resentment, «bad conscience», etc. 
From the apophatic point of view this denial of 
hypothetical remains hypothetical, because it sets 
the rules of interpretation of the experience and 
criteria for the of actual creativity, making a circle 
in justification. Apophatic reason goes away from 
the concreteness of experience to identify the 
limiting conditions of its possibility. The reality 
is not completed by Reason. Even when Reason 
says about the coincidence of thinking and being, 
it is not able to carry out such an experience 
that would exceed its capabilities. It is possible 
to derive the rules from the «transcendental 
empiricism» and «mysticism of concepts»16 
that reason must follow to «make, remake and 
unmake» its concepts, but not what lies at the 
basis of the conditions of reality of its experience. 
Hypothetical is the essence of absolute experience 
of Reason and it does not specify not only the 
rules of the game, but the game itself, equalizing 
the rights of sedentary and nomadism. Game is 
set by faith or ability that declared the abolition 
of faith17.
Badiou insists that behind the visibility of 
rejection of the opposition of the One and Multiple 
Deleuze’s univocal Being asserts the renewed 
concept of the One18. However, in one of those 
passages to which he refers, Deleuze writes:
None the less, the core of the notion 
is the constitution of a substantive in which 
‘multiple’ ceases to be a predicate opposed 
to the One, or attributable to a subject 
identified as one. Multiplicity remains 
completely indifferent to the traditional 
problems of the multiple and the one, and 
above all to the problem of a subject who 
would think through this multiplicity, give 
it conditions, account for its origins, and so 
on. There is neither one nor multiple, which 
would at all events entail having recourse to 
a consciousness that would be regulated by 
the one and developed by the other19.
Is it possible, following Badiou, to say that 
univocity of Being more or less speaks in favor of 
the fact that such withdrawal from the opposition 
of one and multiple provides qualitative raising 
up of one of its terms (One)? In the cited passage 
transcendental field is implied, the field that is free 
from determination as that of a consciousness, 
which, as we know, always requires subjectivation. 
In addition, as Badiou reminds us, Deleuze rejects 
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intentionality also because all manifestations of 
being are external to each other and none of them 
(including consciousness) has the advantage of 
implication the others, to represent them. In this 
light, the One and the Other appear as forms of 
Identity, through which consciousness is trying 
to implicate the Being, i.e, as if to make it out of 
itself. Therefore, if the statement Badiou is correct, 
thus only in the sense of the One-All of which he 
speaks, i.e., in the sense of “the transcendent in 
the immanent.” For consciousness, that demands 
a subject to itself, to deny themselves in favor of 
the higher unconscious activity, it needs to be 
regulated by the one and developed by the other, 
i.e. be capable of such a denial, unless of course 
it does not consider this unconsciousness more 
“stupid” than itself.
The One and the Other are indistinguishable 
at the level of first hypothesis. The difference 
between them comes along with being, and 
exactly on the basis of this distinction one of them 
becomes approved as the foundation of being. 
Since the principle of being, for Deleuze, is the 
Difference (moving horizon, an always decentred 
centre), One-All refers rather to the apophatic 
Other than to the One. The Other, when it comes 
down to the level occupied by the One in the 
second hypothesis of “Parmenides” appears as a 
continuous simulation of unity, which serves the 
return of the Other. This simulation is, actually, 
being, defined by the Other. To be is to make a 
golden figurines and immediately throw them 
into smelting chamber.
Deleuze’s virtuality, always remaining 
superfluous in relation to the actual, deprives 
relationship between the actualities its productive 
creative force, as it was in the Stoic ontology20. 
Since the distinction and communicating do 
not belong to the essence of things, but being 
concentrated in essence of Being, from which 
they come, all becoming-of-something embodies 
not transcendent pattern that refers to the One, but 
the inherent power of Difference, which provides 
identity fleeting sameness of existance and 
realizes that what Hegel called as “concreteness 
of the absolute”. Like the Absolute Spirit, 
Deleuze’s Virtuality does not receive content 
from the current becoming (although the motif 
of infinite novelty hampers it), but it differs by 
infinitely avoiding identity and at the same time 
it preserves the unity of «cast of Being» – higher 
simulation of its identity.
3. The Immanence and Theology
Theology is based on the existential sense 
of transcendent, so whenever the border of 
this sense being trespassed, it risks to mingle 
with philosophy. We must admit that to define 
this border in some specific cases can be very 
difficult. Disputes around the theme of negative 
theology in the works of Derrida clearly showed 
that even apophasis remains a territory of 
mixed philosophical and theological discourses, 
even though it should primarily serve their 
differentiation, making the clearest distinction 
between inconceivable and absurd. Inconceivable, 
when it somehow conceived, tends to displace the 
absurd with the assistance of the faith. Therefore, 
the analysis of a particular philosophy in its 
apophatic perspective is able to show how this 
displacement occurs. By Deleuze, as we see, in 
negative Otherness substantiates the mechanism 
of One-All, which provides comprehension of the 
higher unconscious activities of the virtuality and 
in a new way repeats the formula of Nicholas of 
Cusa – “attingitur inattingibile inattingibiliter21». 
A bit different mechanism finds himself in 
«impossible» of Derrida and Caputo. But the 
driving force for all of these configurations 
is faith, which reason for existence is its own 
death.
Since man is doomed to believe, the cases 
of overcoming faith remain a private matter of 
«speculative thinker» and those who managed 
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to lug off (on the other side is fanaticism, when 
faith commits suicide without the help of other 
abilities). But even in these cases, faith can’t 
disappear without a trace, saving as a passive 
synthesis of assurance. We noted above that in 
the depth of Deleuze’s thought concluded the 
absurd that permeates the «eternal return», since 
the fact that the great Forgetting is impossible 
without non-being, whereas it has no place even 
in being. This absurd is safely protected by the 
sight of Being, which smoothes its folds, and by 
the denial of the transcendent seen in univocity 
of Being. However, from the apophatic point 
of view it is clear that the Difference remains 
hypothetical, like Identity, and that the way in 
which Deleuze learned its incomprehensibility, 
can not overcome the absurdity of existence in 
order to take its place. Denial of the soul and 
eternal bliss enclosed in this comprehension, fully 
inherits the hypothetical, which characterizes 
denial of apophatic transcendence and the 
Difference. However, the power of thought of 
Deleuze is so high that creates the apparition of a 
complete overcoming of faith.
Is it permissible, in that case, to talk about 
Deleuze’s theology? Of course, his philosophy can 
be interpreted theologically, just like any other22. 
One may wonder whether to consider a “plan of 
immanence” as a challenge to the faith, to which 
it must respond, or as a condition of faith, i.e. a 
moment of its own that hasn’t been realized by 
it yet. There’s also a great temptation to follow 
the path of moral obligation, which is approved 
by Deleuze, to discover his religious motives. But 
all of these approaches will not respond to the 
question ad rem, especially now, when the word 
“ontotheology” became a shibboleth that marks 
the accordance of discourse to contemporary 
philosophical process. If theology is a thematizing 
of faith, then we don’t find it in Deleuze’s ideas, 
because he does not thematizes even assurance 
behind which the absurd of Forgetting hides.
This means that we, basically, can only 
talk about the denial of theology by Deleuze, 
i.e., about his methods of overcoming those 
motives and configurations that were born by 
faith in revelation. His thoughts on this subject 
are known too well to repeat them here, so 
we emphasize only on their anti-theological 
focus, which subject is to expose the existential 
illusions. Nietzsche’s concept of the death of God 
is crucial here. However, as Deleuze says, the last 
philosopher of “death of God” was Feuerbach, 
and for Nietzsche the essence of this event is the 
death of a man who is not longer determined by 
the God-form23. At Foucault, about whom Deleuze 
repeats a question of Overman, he finds four folds 
of subjectivation, the latter of which – fold of the 
outside itself – determines the force that shapes 
human beings as creature of expectation, i.e., 
implying the meaning and destiny of his self24. 
Hence it becomes the defining question of what 
is the outside itself, which will participate in the 
future becoming of subjectivity. It is obvious, that 
a Virtual should become this external, abolishing 
God and the perspective of eternal bliss in favor 
of diversity and new forms of life. Although the 
claim that Virtuality revives the transcendental 
under a different name is not unreasonable25, it is 
«transcendent in immanent,» as we have already 
noted, can be considered as theological only in the 
virtue of mixing absurdity and inconceivability, 
negative theology and apophasis, i.e. in on behalf 
of Reason that considers itself as the winner over 
faith or in the interests of faith that considers 
itself being conquered by Reason and became 
what Zizek calls «unfaith» 26.
The formula of Overman confronts the 
existence, challenging its paradoxical nature at 
one side of which is temporalization to eternity, 
and on the other – the abandonment into a fallen 
world, or worse, a faceless Being, generating 
personality in a amazing manner27. The true 
form time, according to Deleuze, contains only 
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the past and the future, which subdivides the 
present to infinity in both directions, depriving 
present of its extension, which would allow 
subjectivity to subdue the time, caging it in 
the networks of teleology28. The present is not 
lost. It is simply absent, like the monolithic soul 
which made it up to impose Being a problem of 
eternity, and through it to establish itself as its 
last truth.
Probably, human spirit did not know such a 
dizzying fall in impersonality after Buddha. But 
even this captivating by its depth interpretation 
of the elusive Time does not prevent from the 
«dialectic of uncertainty», which casts doubt on 
the possibility of understanding reality, based 
only on conditions of real experience. It appears to 
be too senseless in its endless renewal, giving the 
impression of Being, which expelled its creator 
and now doomed to multiply itself with its own 
repetition, in which one can only infinitely die 
and believe that God still gives people traceless 
death, which is impossible, but it remains the 
only hope if the rejection of eternal life already 
can not be cancel.
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Плоскость имманентности  
и апология трансцендентности 
В.Н. Дробышев
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гуманитарная академия 
Россия, 190000, Санкт-Петербург, 
набережная реки Фонтанки, 15
В статье исследуется мотив имманентности и его концептуализация в философии 
Ж. Делёза. Автор показывает невозможность отождествления экзистенциальной 
абсурдности и философской непостижимости и на этом основании исключает возможность 
теологического прочтения “плана имманенции”, несмотря на то, что за ним открывается 
обновленное понятие трансцендентного. Преодоление веры в философии Делёза следует за 
обоснованием условий реального опыта, противопоставляемых условиям его возможности 
и гипотетичности как таковой. Однако анализ этой философии в ее апофатической 
перспективе показывает невозможность замещения гипотетичности реальностью опыта.
Ключевые слова: Делёз, апофазис, вера, трансцендентность, имманентность, 
экзистенциальный.
Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.
